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Comment on Brian R. Cheffins, Dividends
as a Substitute for Corporate Law: The
Separation of Ownership and Control
in the United Kingdom
Lynne L. Dallas*
In his paper, Professor Cheffins advances our knowledge of the history of
dispersed ownership and in the process sheds light on important corporate
governance issues of our day. His research is prodigious and his footnotes are a
treasure trove of valuable information. He offers theories that, while subject to
challenge, are well supported and worthy of serious attention.
I limit my remarks to three essential points. The first is that the
interrelationship among law, markets, and norms is much more complex than
the "law matters" thesis articulated by Cheffins. Second, there are substantial
hazards in using the LLSV study' in an analysis such as Cheffins does to
determine the state of shareholder protections. And lastly, the role of dividends
in explaining dispersed shareholding remains ambiguous.
First, let us consider the interrelationship among law, markets, and norms.
Cheffins explains that the predominant corporate governance model, the
contractarian model, views corporate law as "trivial., 2 Relations are driven
according to this model by market forces supported by "norm-based
governance."3  According to this model, law plays at most a "modest
supplementary role," mainly in "help[ing] private parties effectuate their
preferred goals.",4 The law matters thesis, as articulated by Cheffins, provides
that law is very important in explaining market developments such as, in this
instance, dispersed shareholding.
* Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law; J.D., Harvard Law School;
B.A. University of Rochester.
1. See generally Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert
W. Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998) (examining legal rules covering
the protection of shareholders in forty-nine countries) [hereinafter LLSV study].
2. Brian R. Cheffins, Dividends as a Substitute for Corporate Law: The Separation of
Ownership and Control in the United Kingdom, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1273, 1284 (2006).
3. Id. at 1283.
4. Id. at 1283-84.
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I believe that this analysis creates a false dichotomy-law does or does not
matter for market developments. This false dichotomy is apparent if one
accepts the socioeconomic claim that laws provide the foundation for markets.5
Although it is analytically useful at times to distinguish law and economic
forces, "markets" are defined by both laws and economic forces. Changes in
the laws produce different markets.6 The law matters theory is thus not about
whether law matters generally, but about the impact of a particular set of laws.
The interrelationship among economic forces, the law, and norms is also
more complex than the law matters thesis suggests. The law matters thesis
appears to imply a one-way relationship in which law explains or causes
economic phenomena. But there are at least four possible interrelationships
between law and economic forces, and law matters for each of these
relationships. First, there is "coordination," where law and economic forces
work hand-in-hand-with law fulfilling the contractarian vision of assisting
parties in effectuating their business objectives. Second, there is "prohibition,"
where the law seeks to prohibit the operation of economic forces altogether
when they represent socially irresponsible behavior such as human trafficking
and child pornography. Third, there is "creation" or "causation"-implicit in
the law matters thesis-where law ex ante creates economic forces by
providing business incentives or a foundation for economic activity. Finally,
there is "regulation," where the consequences of economic forces suggest the
need for law expost when these economic forces produce unfairness, harm, or
demonstrate the need for coordination rules. For example, The Securities Act
of 1933 was regulation that responded expost to the 1929 stock market crash.7
Of course, the distinction between law operating ex ante and ex post becomes
muddied because a law passed ex post becomes embedded in the market and
may affect ex ante future economic forces. In addition, in some cases norms
will substitute for law and make law unnecessary. 8 "Soft" law is often
sufficient to maintain social order and coordination. In that situation, law
matters as well because it lies in the wings for a time when it may become
necessary.
5. See LYNNE L. DALLAS, LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY: A SOCIOECONOMIC APPROACH 13
(2005) ("[L]aw and norms provide the foundations for a market economy.").
6. See id. at 14 (discussing the differences between the views of neoclassical economists
and institutional economists).
7. See JAMES D. Cox, ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 3 (3d ed. 2001) (providing legislative history on the
Securities Act of 1933).
8. See DONALD BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF LAW 6-7, 107 (1976) (discussing the
relationship between law and social control).
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Cheffins argues that corporate law does not matter because dispersed
shareholding evolved in Britain when there were insufficient shareholder
protections.9 Assuming for the moment that this claim is true, corporate law
nevertheless mattered because it worked hand-in-hand with the desires of
businesses, regulating the transfer of corporate shares to the public and
regulating mergers and acquisitions which contributed to the dispersion of
shares. Also, when potential harms to the public were realized, law sought to
influence and shape these economic forces to protect the public shareholders.
Law mattered to the development of dispersed shareholding irrespective of
whether shareholder protections preceded or followed these economic
phenomena.
It is also important to point out that economic development involves an
evolutionary process that is dynamic and fluid.'0 No single factor such as the
law can fully explain what a complex interaction of socioeconomic forces will
produce. Law is embedded in a larger social canvas of socio-cultural
relationships. A serious risk of the law matters thesis is that law is viewed in
isolation from other factors contributing to these relationships. The prognosis
of the law matters thesis is that by having specific laws, dispersed shareholding
or other socioeconomic phenomena will likely emerge. A one-size-fits-all
prescription, however, is unlikely to bear fruit.
This brings me to my second point concerning the LLSV study, which,
according to its authors, sends the "message" that the "quality of legal
protection[s] of shareholders help determine ownership concentration[s]." 11
The quality of legal protection is determined by an anti-director index
composed of six pro-investor rights.12 The six legal rules are: mail-in proxies,
no requirements for depositing shares prior to shareholder meetings, cumulative
voting, oppressed minority mechanisms, preemptive rights, and at least a ten
percent shareholder call provision. A nation is allocated one point for each rule
it has adopted. Cheffins uses the anti-director index to show that Britain did
not have adequate shareholder protections in place when the dispersion of
ownership purportedly occurred in Britain in the decades following WWII.
Despite the extensive use by comparative corporate law scholars of the
LLSV study,13 I have a number of problems with it. First, the LLSV study
9. See Cheffins, supra note 2, at 1288-89 (discussing the power of shareholders under
U.K. company law).
10. See generally DALLAS, supra note 3, at 693-722 (describing the purpose and
consequences of introducing a liberalized market in Russia).
11. LLSV study, supra note 1, at 1151.
12. See id. at 1123 (listing the six anti-director rights).
13. See Sofie Cools, The Real Difference in Corporate Law Between the United States
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considers law in isolation. This approach is suspect as too simplistic when law
is viewed as embedded in specific socioeconomic contexts. In addition, each
rule is treated equally, but no justification for this allocation is provided. Also,
there are no reasons given for including these rules in the index and excluding
other rules. For example, how about shareholder proposal rules, shareholder
initiation rights, subjects on which shareholders may vote, removal of director
provisions, or super-majority shareholder voting requirements for fundamental
changes? Moreover, the index does not take account of the fact that dissimilar
call provisions, for example, may operate similarly to provide minority
shareholder protection, depending on the extent of concentrated or dispersed
shareholding. The anti-director index is particularly suspect when a revision of
it resulted in the United States receiving a relatively low score of 3.0 (out of a
possible 6 points), even though the United States is supposedly the prime
example of an economy with shareholder protections and dispersed
shareholding. 1
4
The anti-director index is also problematic for encouraging less detailed
consideration of corporate laws as they bear on shareholder protections. For
example, Cheffins notes that substantial amendments were made to the U.K.
company law in 1967 but the "anti-director index ... remained unchanged."' 5
His paper does not make an independent assessment of whether these
amendments actually provided greater shareholder protection or created public
perceptions of the existence of greater protections.
The literature evidences fundamental disagreements among U.K. scholars
regarding when dispersed shareholding occurred and the state of shareholder
protection. British scholar Julian Franks and his coauthors maintain that
"dispersed ownership emerged rapidly in the first half of the 20th century,"' 6
whereas Cheffins claims that it occurred during the second half of the century.'
7
Franks claims that "1948 was a defining date for minority investor
and Continental Europe: Distribution of Powers, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 697, 699-700 (2005)
("One can say that Law and Finance is a standard reference in comparative corporate and
financial law.").
14. See Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer,
The Law and Economics of Self Dealing, (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
11883, Table XII, 2005), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl 1883 (showing the results
of the revised anti-director index for countries around the world).
15. Cheffins, supra note 2, at 1291.
16. Julian Franks, Colin Mayer & Stefano Rossi, Ownership: Evolution and Regulation
(March 25, 2005), http://papers.ssm.com/so13/papers.cfln?abstractid=354381 (last visited
Nov. 14, 2006) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
17. See Cheffins, supra note 2, at 1285-86 (discussing the decline of the family empire
and the rise of ownership separated from control).
1342
COMMENT ON BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, DIVIDENDS
protection,"' 8 whereas Cheffins claims it was in the 1980s.' 9 Although the
disagreement over when dispersed shareholding occurred is troublesome and
may be attributed to sample sizes, the disagreement concerning when
shareholder protections were in place is probably due to the exclusive attention
given by Cheffins to the London Stock Exchange (LSE) disclosure requirement
index, which only takes into account statutory enactments.20 In contrast, Franks
considered the LSE listing rules as well as statutory enactments and found them
effective in providing shareholder protections in 1947.2 Cheffins's analysis
rests on the fact that Britain's disclosure requirement index score rose from .33
to .66 in the 1980s when the Financial Services Act of 1986 gave the "London
Stock Exchange Listing Rules [the status] of subordinate legislation. 22 At that
point, the LSE listing rules were included in the index. If the significance of
shareholder protections to the emergence of dispersed shareholding is being
assessed, I would include shareholder protections provided by the quasi-legal
listing rules. Unlike other nations, Britain has a tradition of relying on "soft"
law.
23
It is also my belief that the authors of the LLSV study do not take
sufficient account of the fact that correlations do not prove causation. After
correlating the anti-director index with ownership concentrations, the authors
state that their results "are at least suggestive that concentration of ownership is
an adaptation to poor legal protection. 24 They claim that their results "support
the idea that heavily concentrated ownership results from, and perhaps
substitutes for, weak protection of investors in a corporate governance
system., 25 It is just as likely, and consistent with other relationships between
law and economic forces, however, that the situation is the reverse-that the
laws are an adaptation or response to the needs of concentrated shareholding or
a reflection of the political power of controlling shareholders.
My last point is that the role of dividends in explaining dispersed
shareholding remains ambiguous. Cheffins claims that dividends played a
18. Id. at 15.
19. Id. at 1292.
20. See id. at 1293 (citing the LSE).
21. See id. (discussing the effects of the 1947 changes to the LSE's listing rules).
22. Cheffins, supra note 2, at 1295 n.92.
23. See JONATHAN P. CHARKHAm, KEEPING BETrER COMPANY: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
TEN YEARS ON 297-98,301-02 (2005) (discussing the concept of corporate governance which
includes an analysis of the way in which companies are directed and controlled as well as an
examination as to how they relate to their financial sources).
24. LLSV study, supra note 1, at 1148.
25. Id. at 1151.
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"significant role" although they were not a "sufficient condition" for the
emergence of dispersed shareholding.26 The problem is that the evidence
Cheffins presents in his article shows no difference in the dividend policies of
U.K. companies prior to and after WWII, 27 even though there was allegedly
concentrated shareholding prior to WWII and dispersed shareholding after
WWII.
On the sell side, if dividends were a significant factor, it would be
important to show how dividends encouraged concentrated shareholders to sell
their shares to the public in one period but not in the other. What causative role
did dividends play? Although dividends generally may contribute to the
liquidity of controlling shareholders and permit controlling shareholders to
access public capital, 8 they do not explain why controlling shareholders
decided to relinquish control to public shareholders in the decades following
WWII.
Turning to the buy side, it is probable that buyers are motivated by
dividends to acquire shares. Cheffins explains that dividends substitute for
corporate law in two ways. First, dividends limit the amount of funds available
to insiders and thus constrain their self-dealing.29 Second, dividends provide
information to investors by signaling to them the financial condition of the
company, although this method is admittedly a coarse substitute for truthful
disclosures. 30 But if dividend policies did not change in the years before and
following WWII, dividends do not explain the increased buyer demand for
stock leading to dispersed shareholding.
Cheffins' well-researched article, however, provides candidates, other than
dividends, to explain the emergence of dispersed shareholding. I do not
purport to know enough about the subject to assess the viability of these
alternative explanations. However, I note that on the buy side, there was a
demand for investments during the decades following WWII due to the
"massive flow of funds to insurance and pension funds that had to be invested
somewhere" and external controls that "tightly constrained investing abroad."3 '
There was also the rise of share ownership by institutions which had the
incentive to encourage public ownership, 32 although, admittedly, institutional
26. Cheffins, supra note 2, at 1335.
27. Id. at 1296-97.
28. Id. at 1301-06.
29. Id. at 1282-83.
30. See id. at 1309 (noting the relation of good shareholder protection and the payment of
dividends).
31. Cheffins, supra note 2, at 1300.
32. Id. at 1282.
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ownership may also produce greater share concentrations. On the sell side,
controlling shareholders faced declining corporate profits and punishing
taxes.33 Individuals at high income tax brackets were taxed at very high tax
rates on distributed dividends.34 Moreover, if closely-held companies with five
or fewer controlling shareholders failed to pay dividends, profits were
apportioned among the owners and they were personally taxed.35 The only way
for these closely-held companies to avoid this tax was for them to become
public companies with a stock market quotation and with at least 25% (and
later 35%) of their shares held in the hands of the public.36 These factors may
have motivated controlling shareholders to sell their shares.
So what can we learn from the history of corporate law, which is the
theme of this symposium? We can learn that explanations of economic
phenomena are complex and that it is important to view law not separately, but
as part of the mix, interacting in various ways with sociocultural and economic
forces to produce economic developments. I believe Cheffins comes to
appreciate this point when he concludes in his last sentence: "To the extent...
dividends contributed to the separation of ownership and control in Britain,
developments in the United Kingdom illustrate that it is necessary to take into
account both the market and law to understand fully how systems of corporate
governance evolve and operate. 
3 7
33. Id. at 1302-03.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Cheffins, supra note 2, at 1302-03.
37. Id. at 1338.
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